A recent analysis from the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF) lays out a stark picture of the global robotics landscape. The report, authored by Robert D. Atkinson and dated November 17, 2025, argues that the People’s Republic of China is making significant headway toward global dominance in robotics, and that the United States is currently not positioned to counter that advance effectively.
The central claim rests on comparative adoption data. According to ITIF calculations, in 2021 China had 12 times more robots in use per manufacturing worker than the United States, when controlling for wage levels. That control matters: higher-wage nations would normally be expected to deploy more robots than lower-wage nations, because automation becomes more cost-effective when labor is expensive. China, with significantly lower labor costs, should therefore have trailed the U.S. in robot density. Instead, it led by a factor of 12. By 2022, the gap had narrowed in relative terms but remained substantial: China had 59 percent more robots per manufacturing worker than the United States.
The report also notes that China installed more robots in that period, though the source material does not provide the specific installation figures. What is clear from the ITIF analysis is that China’s manufacturing scale, its extensive component supply chains, and substantial state-backed funding are all contributing to its advance in robotics, including humanoid platforms.
The ITIF report is not limited to humanoid robots; it covers robotics broadly as part of a larger argument about “national power industries.” But the humanoid segment is a growing focus, and the same dynamics apply. China’s firms are described by one expert cited in the report as “at least on-par, and possibly ahead, of the United States and Europe in robotics,” with particular strength on the hardware side, especially for automotive applications.
The U.S. situation, per ITIF, is characterized by anemic adoption rates. The report states that U.S. robotics adoption is even behind China, a country with significantly lower labor costs. While American innovators continue to produce cutting-edge robotics breakthroughs, the actual production of industrial robots is now dominated by foreign competitors. The report goes further: the United States has no domestic foundries producing robots.
ITIF attributes this lag not to a lack of American ingenuity but to policy choices. The report notes that other nations have established national goals and strategies to support robotics innovation and adoption, while the United States has established policies that tend to harm robotics adoption and innovation. One example cited: some nations have proactive tax policies to incentivize robotics adoption, while the United States offers less-generous tax treatment. The source material does not specify which nations have those proactive tax policies or the exact U.S. tax treatment details, so those specifics remain undisclosed in this summary.
The broader ITIF argument, as presented in the source material, is that China’s state subsidies constitute more than aggressive competition. The report characterizes China’s systematic use of below-market financing, production subsidies, and state-directed overcapacity as “predatory innovation mercantilism” designed to capture entire industries rather than compete on merit. ITIF argues these strategies violate World Trade Organization (WTO) subsidy rules, antidumping principles, and basic trade norms.
The report’s conclusion is direct: unless the United States and its allies are stronger than China in particular industries, and thus have more techno-economic leverage over China than China has over them, U.S. power vis-à-vis China will be limited. The implications, ITIF argues, are transformative for the global balance of power and U.S. national interests.
The source material also references a separate ITIF report by Hilal Aka, dated October 6, 2025, on Big Tech’s contribution to U.S. innovation, which documents China’s subsidy practices. And it cites a 2009 assessment by Capital Trade Incorporated, submitted to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, on China’s subsidies to strategic and heavyweight industries.
What the source material does not provide is specific quantitative data on humanoid robot production volumes, deployment numbers, or market share. The report’s focus is on the broader robotics sector, with humanoid robots positioned as an emerging and strategically important segment within that landscape. The exact timeline for humanoid robot commercialization, cost curves, or specific technical benchmarks are not disclosed in the provided text.
Why it matters for European robot service
For European readers, and particularly for those involved in robot service, maintenance, integration, and deployment, this analysis carries several implications that deserve careful consideration.
First, the competitive dynamics described by ITIF are not confined to a U.S.-China bilateral contest. Europe is explicitly mentioned in the source material as part of the comparison. The expert cited in the ITIF report said China is “at least on-par, and possibly ahead, of the United States and Europe in robotics.” That places Europe in the same relative position as the United States: behind or at best level with China in certain robotics segments, particularly on the hardware side.
For European robot service providers, this means the competitive landscape is shifting. If China continues to scale its robotics manufacturing and component supply chains, the cost and availability of robotic hardware will increasingly be influenced by Chinese production decisions. Service providers who work with industrial robots, and eventually humanoid robots, may find that the equipment they service comes from a narrower set of global suppliers, with China playing a dominant role.
The ITIF report’s emphasis on China’s component supply chains is particularly relevant. Robotics is not just about the final assembly of a humanoid or industrial arm; it is about the entire ecosystem of motors, actuators, sensors, controllers, and software. If those components are increasingly produced in China, then service providers in Europe will need to consider supply chain resilience, spare part availability, and the long-term viability of the platforms they support.
Second, the report’s characterization of China’s state support as “predatory innovation mercantilism” has direct implications for how European companies compete. If China is using below-market financing and production subsidies to capture entire industries, then European robot service firms may face competitors who are not playing by the same commercial rules. This is not a hypothetical concern; the ITIF report documents these practices extensively, and the source material cites WTO subsidy rules and antidumping principles as being violated.
For European service providers, this could mean margin pressure. If Chinese robot manufacturers can offer hardware at prices that do not reflect true production costs, then service contracts tied to those platforms may also face downward pricing pressure. Alternatively, it could mean that European service providers need to differentiate on service quality, response capability, and domain expertise rather than on price alone.
Third, the report’s observation that the United States has no domestic foundries producing robots is a structural fact that has implications beyond the U.S. market. If the U.S. cannot produce robots domestically, then its entire robotics ecosystem, including service, depends on foreign suppliers. Europe is in a somewhat different position, with its own robotics manufacturers, but the trend toward consolidation and Chinese dominance could affect European supply chains as well.
The ITIF report argues that unless the United States strengthens its robotics industry, it risks falling behind China. The same logic applies to Europe. The report does not provide specific policy recommendations for Europe, but the implication is clear: nations and regions that do not have explicit strategies to support robotics innovation and adoption will find themselves increasingly dependent on Chinese technology.
For the European robot service sector, this raises strategic questions. Should service providers align themselves with Chinese platforms, given their likely cost advantages? Or should they focus on European and other non-Chinese platforms, accepting potentially higher hardware costs in exchange for supply chain security and alignment with European regulatory frameworks? The source material does not answer these questions, but it provides the context in which they must be asked.
Fourth, the report’s timeline matters. The ITIF analysis was published in November 2025, and the data cited is from 2021 and 2022. The robotics landscape may have shifted since then, but the source material does not provide more recent data. What is clear is that China’s trajectory, as of the report’s writing, was one of aggressive expansion. The report’s conclusion that U.S. power vis-à-vis China will be limited unless the U.S. strengthens its position is a warning that applies to Europe as well.
For European robot service providers, the practical takeaway is that the competitive environment is becoming more challenging, and the strategic choices made now will have long-term consequences. The report does not provide a playbook for European firms, but it does provide a clear-eyed assessment of the forces at play.
What buyers and operators should know
For buyers and operators of robot services, particularly those considering humanoid robots or expanding their industrial robotics fleets, the ITIF analysis offers several points worth weighing.
First, the adoption gap described in the report has direct implications for the maturity of the service ecosystem. When a region has significantly fewer robots per manufacturing worker, as the United States does relative to China, the service infrastructure for those robots tends to be less developed. Fewer deployed robots mean fewer trained technicians, fewer specialized service providers, and less accumulated operational experience. Buyers and operators in regions with lower adoption rates may find that service availability, response times, and spare part inventories are less robust than in regions with higher adoption.
The source material does not provide specific data on service response times, spare part lead times, or service provider density. Those details are not disclosed in the ITIF report. What the report does establish is the relative adoption gap, and buyers should consider how that gap translates into service readiness.
Second, the report’s emphasis on China’s component supply chains is directly relevant to operational planning. If a significant portion of robotic components are manufactured in China, then supply chain disruptions, trade policy changes, or geopolitical tensions could affect the availability of spare parts and replacement units. The source material does not specify which components are most vulnerable or what the lead times are, but the structural fact of Chinese dominance in component production is established.
For operators, this suggests a need for supply chain due diligence. Understanding where the critical components of a robot are manufactured, and what the alternative sources are, should be part of the procurement and maintenance planning process. The report does not provide a checklist for this, but it does highlight the concentration risk.
Third, the report’s characterization of China’s state subsidies as violating WTO rules has implications for pricing stability. If Chinese manufacturers are benefiting from below-market financing and production subsidies, then their pricing may not be sustainable in the long term. A robot purchased at an artificially low price today may not have a stable cost structure for spare parts and service tomorrow, if the subsidies are challenged or withdrawn. The source material does not predict when or how such challenges might occur, but it does document the practices.
Buyers should therefore be cautious about making procurement decisions based solely on upfront hardware costs. Total cost of ownership, including service, spare parts, and the long-term viability of the manufacturer, should be part of the evaluation. The report does not provide specific cost data, but it provides the strategic context.
Fourth, the report’s observation that the United States has no domestic foundries producing robots is a structural fact that affects the entire global market. If the U.S. cannot produce robots, then the U.S. market is entirely dependent on imports. That dependence creates a dynamic where U.S. buyers are subject to the pricing and availability decisions of foreign manufacturers. The same dynamic could affect Europe if European production capacity does not keep pace.
For operators, this means that the geopolitical dimension of robotics procurement is not a side issue; it is central to supply security. The ITIF report argues that unless the U.S. strengthens its robotics industry, it risks falling behind China. For buyers, the question is whether their own supply chains are resilient in the face of this competitive struggle.
Fifth, the report’s expert citation that China is “at least on-par, and possibly ahead, of the United States and Europe in robotics” is a sobering assessment. For buyers considering humanoid robots, this suggests that Chinese platforms may be as technically capable as Western ones, at least on the hardware side. The source material notes that Chinese firms are strong on hardware, especially for automotive applications. The software and service ecosystem around those platforms is not assessed in the source material, so buyers will need to evaluate that themselves.
Finally, the report does not provide specific guidance on which robot platforms to choose or which service providers to engage. It is a policy analysis, not a buyer’s guide. What it offers is a framework for understanding the competitive dynamics that will shape the market in the coming years. Buyers and operators who understand those dynamics will be better positioned to make informed decisions.
The source material also does not disclose specific figures for China’s robot installations beyond the per-worker comparisons, nor does it provide data on humanoid robot deployment specifically. The report’s focus is on the broader robotics sector, and the humanoid segment is discussed as part of that larger picture. Buyers should be aware that the quantitative data in the report is from 2021 and 2022, and more recent figures are not provided in the source material.
Sources
https://itif.org/publications/2026/07/14/the-u-s-humanoid-robot-industry-is-falling-behind/
Published by Vigla Media OÜ (Estonia).